“Nothing to invite or to reward a separate examination”: Sidgwick and Whewell by Cremaschi, Sergio
Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics, X, 2008, 2, pp. 137-184 
“Nothing to invite or to reward a separate examination”: 
Sidgwick and Whewell 
 
 
Sergio Cremaschi 
Dipartimento di Studi Umanistici 
Università del Piemonte orientale 
sergio.cremaschi@lett.unipmn.it 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper I discuss Sidgwick’s reaction to Whewell’s moral philosophy. I show 
how, to Sidgwick’s eyes, Whewell’s philosophy looked as an emblem of the set of be-
liefs, primarily religious, into which he had been socialised, and that his reaction was 
over-determined by both his own ambivalent feelings to his own Anglican upbringing 
and his subtle rhetorical strategy practised by presenting new shocking ideas hidden 
between an amount of platitudes and playing the neutral observer or the ‘philosopher 
of morality’ instead than acting the part of the preacher of a new morality. Then I 
discuss Sidgwick’s assessment of Whewell’s doctrine as an idle systematisation of re-
ceived opinion and the reasons why in the Methods he feels entitled to dismiss histori-
cally given intuitionism as ‘dogmatic intuitionism’ without detailed criticism and dis-
cusses instead a so-called ‘intuitional method’ as one of the procedures allegedly used 
by common sense. Besides, I show how individual instances of detailed criticism to 
Whewell’s doctrines are meant to be not ‘real’ criticism of a rival outlook but instead 
illustrations of the limits of ‘common-sense morality’. My final claims are: first, Sidg-
wick ends with a short-circuit between a inner dialectic of his own argument and dis-
cussion of rival doctrines; second, the weight of Whewell’s legacy in Sidgwick’s ethics 
has been heavily underemphasized. 
 
 
 
His elements of Morality could be nothing bet-
ter than a classification and systematizing of 
the opinions which he found prevailing among 
those who had been educated according to the 
approved methods of his own country; or, let 
us rather say, an apparatus for converting 
those prevailing opinions, on matters of mo-
rality, into reasons for themselves…  
He leaves the subject so exactly as he found 
it…that it can scarcely be counted as anything 
more than one of the thousand waves on the 
dead sea of commonplace, affording nothing to 
invite or to reward a separate examination. 
John Stuart Mill. 
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1. Sidgwick and ‘intuitionism’: which and whose?  
 
“Probably nothing did more to discredit Whewell’s system than Sidg-
wick’s study of Intuitionism in his Methods of Ethics” (1). This is hardly 
surprising since, in a well-known passage, Sidgwick candidly mentions 
what he names “my early aversion to Intuitional Ethics derived from the 
study of Whewell” (2). In other words, it seems that the reasons for Sidg-
wick’s strategy of dismantling Intuitionism and proving its irreparable 
limits was motivated by his antipathy to a book that had been a juvenile 
(compulsory) reading as well as to its author. In view of this circum-
stance, one may wonder whether Sidgwick’s campaign has been so effec-
tive as to blur the memory of Whewell’s ethics to the point that, until re-
cently, the Sidgwick scholarship, while paying due attention to the topic 
of intuitionism in Sidgwick, did usually not go much beyond than repeat-
ing as a mantra the threefold distinction between perceptive, dogmatic, 
and philosophical intuitionism, and referring in all seriousness the infor-
mation that dogmatic intuitionism was hopelessly unable to solve the di-
lemmas left by perceptive intuitionism and besides was a way of giving an 
appearance of intellectual respectability to moral prejudice. Some of the 
more recent literature tries to discuss the meaning and scope of ‘intuition-
ism’ in Sidgwick’s ethics by careful textual reading and linguistic analysis 
of Sidgwick’s own assertions, without even including in the bibliography 
the intuitionist authors whose views Sidgwick was criticizing or partially 
endorsing in the hope that real intuitionism is intuitionism as described 
by Sidgwick. The reasons? The usual ones, namely, Anglo-Saxon phobia 
vis-à-vis the history of philosophy, and world-wide spread powerlessness 
when facing the task of looking for books one cannot find in one’s De-
partment Library, besides the ruinous effect of Sidgwick’s campaign.  
The result is that everybody repeats, as if it were a source of objective 
historical information, what Sidgwick says in his preface to the seventh 
edition of the Methods, that is: he was disgusted by lack of clarity in defi-
nitions when compared with those by mathematicians (nothing less, with 
all that Aristotle has said about the lesser degree of certainty of the 
propositions with which practical philosophy has to start compared with 
the purely theoretical parts of philosophy) and he felt that this textbook 
he had to study as an undergraduate was a systematisation of all the un-
justified moral teachings he had been imparted in his childhood. Nobody 
reflected about the circumstances that this was a senile restatement of 
events that occurred decades before; that these reactions referred to an 
item of compulsory reading in somebody’s education; that this item was 
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signed by somebody who was one of the older dons of the same college as 
Sidgwick’s, a generation with which Sidgwick had a conflictive relation-
ship for many years; that this senile restatement echoes strangely Mill’s 
opinion on Whewell’s Elements, “nothing better than a classification and 
systematizing of the opinions which he found prevailing”, that is, what 
the educated public had been in the meanwhile educated into thinking 
through the extraordinary influence won in the meanwhile by Mill as a 
“public moralist”; that Whewell had been a public figure in a context 
where he and Mill had been for a time the champions of the Old and the 
New, and that the New had won the war, so to say making no prisoner, 
and even in the Church of England the trend represented by Whewell had 
been wiped out and substituted by either a more ‘progressive’ trend – a 
kind of Anglicanised Unitarianism such as that proposed by Bishop Ba-
den Powell (the father of George) and other liberal Anglican divines – or 
the more traditional trend of Evangelicalism, and last of all, that the 
strictly philosophical doctrines by Whewell were in Sidgwick’s eyes not 
only intertwined with a wider overall view, religious and political, but 
were part of a set of beliefs (a moderately enlightened Anglicanism with a 
moderate liberal Whiggish political outlook) that were part of Sidgwick’s 
own Bildung, that he never totally rejected and looked from outside but 
always cherished as a lost Ithaca to which he would have liked, were it 
possible, to come back some day. 
This may be enough in order to account for ambivalences, turns, and 
tensions in Sidgwick’s relationship to Intuitionism in general and Whe-
well in particular, but looking at these only, as Schulz tries to do (3), 
would only yield a ‘genetic’ history of ideas of one of the most familiar 
Continental kinds, and a not very enlightening one. What I suggest to do 
is instead taking this background into account and trying to detect which 
things Sidgwick was trying to do with words. That is, I suggest we should 
make the most of one remark by Schulz himself, namely that in his major 
works: 
 
Sidgwick appears to have applied the lessons that he had set out so 
many years before, for his friends in the Initial Society. That is, he be-
came quite expert at masking the originality and subversiveness of his 
claims by the Mauricean tactic of presenting them as mere developments 
of received belief, cloaking his real insights with massive tomes of re-
spectable opinion so that few could apprehend how destructive his criti-
cism was trivialities… Perhaps, as with the Methods, Sidgwick always felt 
that the respectable views he criticized were enduring elements of his own 
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being, and that the criticism really was a form of self-scrutiny, an inner 
Socratic dialectic rather than “hostile criticism from the outside” (4). 
 
I would like to add that Sidgwick staged a twofold strategy in order to 
deal with Whewell, a strategy indeed he tended to mount also in many 
other occasions: on the one hand he develops an inner Socratic dialectic 
with views that were still part of himself, albeit as a polarity of a Hege-
lian dialectic between beliefs we would like to have and beliefs we have to 
be rest content with, and at the same time he develops an external rhe-
torical strategy aimed at an audience made of a majority of educated and 
rather traditional Victorian readers and a minority of progressive Millian 
readers. 
In my attempt, I start with conclusions reached by Donagan and 
Schneewind, the ones who first started reading the Methods as a text, not 
as an oracle. Donagan provided the proof of the rather obvious conclusion 
that Sidgwick had not really read Whewell’s arguments on the main 
points on which he attacked intuitionism and that his refutation of intu-
itionist arguments is curiously enough a suggestion of the fact that com-
mon sense has no answer to a number of doubts concerning limitations in 
the scope of principles and conflicts among principles, not a detailed an-
swer to arguments provided by Price, Reid, and most of all Whewell in 
order to settle the issues under discussion (5). Schneewind has taken a 
step further, namely he has read first Sidgwick not as Moore’s reluctant 
stepfather, but instead in the light of the controversy between Mill and 
Whewell; in this way he has shown why to Sidgwick occurred the not-too-
peregrine idea of reconciling utilitarianism and intuitionism and where he 
found the arguments in favour and against each of his own three methods 
(6). In Schulz’s words, 
 
an excellent way to approach the Methods is by reading it, as 
Schneewind has done, in the light of the great conflicts between Mill, the 
romanticized utilitarian, and Whewell, the intuitionist defender of ortho-
doxy whom Mill himself singled out as representing just about everything 
that utilitarianism should oppose (7). 
 
In fact, in the former phase, the young Sidgwick found in Mill a spiri-
tual guide in his own search for freedom of thought. It may be reminded 
that he corresponded with him at the time of his famous conscientious ob-
jection to subscription of the 39 articles of the Anglican faith required to 
Cambridge faculty members. Sidgwick mentioned later on also the cir-
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cumstance that Mill’s ‘hedonism’ sounded attractive to him as a kind of 
“relief from the apparently external and arbitrary pressure of moral 
rules” which he had been educated to obey (8). But in subsequent phases 
Sidgwick also discovered the attractiveness of a Goethian neo-pagan ideal 
and wavered more than once between the alternative enticements of mys-
ticism, benevolence, and hedonism, or religion, utilitarianism, and roman-
tic aestheticism. Also his way of reading more strictly philosophical doc-
trines was coloured by their associations with these more encompassing 
world-views. Also his way of reading Whewell’s moral doctrine is over-
determined by his own personal experiences, that is, by the circumstances 
that Whewell, with whom he was directly acquainted, was to his eyes 
connected with the set of religious beliefs he had been imbibed with in his 
boyhood and to which he longed all his life long to come back, if only it 
were possible. Without such ambivalent personal experience, probably 
Whewellian intuitionism would have been discussed more at length and in 
a more detached manner, and the rather powerful dose of intuitionism 
Sidgwick finally thought it proper to take would have been openly ac-
knowledged as Whewell’s legacy. Finally, another factor played in favour 
of under-stressing Whewell’s legacy, namely the wary rhetorical strategy-
cum-tactic stages by Sidgwick. On the one hand Sidgwick as a public fig-
ure – the proponent of educational reforms, the women’s rights etc. – had 
as partners both ‘militant’ Millians and respectable enlightened Angli-
cans; for both these groups the Methods were too obscure a work, and yet 
it was important not to arise polemics that could reach this wider audi-
ence; thus, not presenting himself too explicitly as an orthodox utilitarian 
was good for the latter part of his audience, not attacking too explicitly 
Whewell could have been good for the former, albeit at the time of the 
Methods Whewell’s star was on the point of declining even in the Anglican 
firmament. Thus, a good tactic in order not to become either group’s en-
emy could have been to pay lip service to Mill’s attacks on Whewell, to 
present himself as being somewhere in between Utilitarians and Intuition-
ists, to keep silent on Whewell the rest of the time, and especially keeping 
up being rather tedious and obscure in the highest degree all the time.   
 
 
2. Whewell’s philosophy of  morality 
 
Let me come back briefly to Whewell’s own ethics. It popped up, at last 
as a sketch, in his Preface to the 1835 edition of MackIntosh’s Disserta-
tion, and by 1845it was developed into a bulky work, the Elements of Mo-
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rality (9). The work was written in order to provide an alternative to 
Paley’s Principles that were still basic reading for undergraduates at 
Cambridge and whose negative influence had been denounced in Sedg-
wick’s Discourse of 1832 (10). In order to provide an alternative to Paley, 
Whewell wanted to offer an anti-empiricist moral philosophy, well-tuned 
with his own anti-empiricist epistemology, rescuing ideas that had 
emerged in Cambridge Anglicanism at the end of the seventeenth-century 
and the beginning of the eighteenth but that had been totally wiped out 
by the Gay-Brown line of voluntarist consequentialism that was later 
systematized in Paley’s Principles of 1785 (11). By doing so, the moder-
ately liberal Anglican Whewell pillaged also the work of the Dissenter 
Richard Price, for rather obvious reasons, without stressing too much the 
circumstance. 
It is fair to say, yet, that Whewell added a lot of his own, primarily a 
para-Kantian moral epistemology, which made room for an a priori ele-
ment in moral discourse while making it compatible with varying histori-
cal institutions by a sort of  ‘circular’ development that provides the 
blueprint for human knowledge, both in the natural science and in ethics: 
from facts to principles and from principles to facts and another quasi-
Kantian idea, the idea of a ‘fact’ of moral judgement that needs clarifica-
tion but does not require any justification. Whewell’s epistemology turns 
around the idea that empiricism heads to vicious circles, and this idea was 
more or less at the centre of his first controversy with Mill, concerning in-
duction (12). In ethics too Whewell contends that empiricism, like in 
Paley and Bentham’s case, heads to a vicious circle, or a hopeless tangle 
made of virtue and happiness. Against empiricism, he defends an idea of 
ethics as being indeed a science – what the empiricists agreed on – but a 
science of a peculiar nature, aiming at some objective truth that is a spe-
cifically moral truth – a point on which he parted company with empiri-
cism. Yet one idea he has clear in mind – it is worth stressing it when fac-
ing Sidgwick’s criticism to intuitionism – is that we do not need to assume 
that we already possess it in full, but it may be a kind of truth we acquire 
step by step, not unlike what happens in the natural sciences (13), whose 
development follows a spiral-shaped pattern travelling between two op-
posite poles, namely clarification of the Idea and discovery of Facts. In 
both physics and morality, 
 
all truths include an Idea and a Fact. The Idea is derived from the 
mind within, the Fact from the world without (14). 
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Not morality, but a “philosophy of morality” is the philosopher’s sub-
ject, since the former already exists, and may be recognized even when 
the eventual reasons for its justification are still a matter of controversy, 
not unlike the theorems of geometry which are agreed upon by mathema-
ticians who disagree in their philosophies of mathematics. This philoso-
phy of morality combines Ideas and Facts trying to build a deductive sys-
tem, which can absorb results of previous systems but be more consistent, 
eliminate inner contradictions and inability to account for moral facts. 
The latter are particular evaluative or prescriptive judgments that pre-
sent themselves as undeniable to everybody’s conscience. Brute facts are 
the laws enforced in one society, viewed at within the framework of the 
process that made them such as they are and accordingly, “though we 
have, in different places, different Laws, we have everywhere the same 
Morality” (15). 
Existence of moral facts is proved by the existence of public opinion 
or by “the great fact of the universal and perpetual judgment of mankind 
on actions as just or unjust”(16), from which a lesson may be drawn, 
namely the fact that  
 
man cannot help judging of actions, as being right or wrong; and that 
men universally reckon this as the supreme difference of actions… this 
characteristic of human nature marks man as a moral being; as a being 
endowed with a faculty or faculties by which he does thus judge (17).  
 
And this fact is indeed “the beginning of all morality” (18). Whewell 
does not claim that “this Faculty or those Faculties by which man thus 
judges of right and wrong should be anything peculiar and ultimate, but 
only that the distinction should be a peculiar and ultimate one” (19). It is 
in so far as human beings form such judgements, not in so far as they feel 
pleasure and pain that they are moral creatures. These, unlike the facts of 
natural science, are prescriptive facts, consisting in the whole of the 
norms imposed by the laws and the public opinion of one society to its 
members; this is the prescriptive form of what a society assumes to be 
moral facts. 
The moralist’s task is working out a set of “Ideas” that will account 
for these facts as a whole, while occasionally correcting their account on 
individual points. In other words: morality qua phenomenon is a fact; 
ethics as an intellectual discipline consists in a twofold task: first, provid-
ing a rational reconstruction of morality qua phenomenon, second, work-
ing out a philosophy of morality, that is a clarification of the ways moral-
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ity works and of the grounds for its justification. A preliminary task for 
the philosopher is working out a consistent account of the contents of mo-
rality so that philosophical reflection may become possible about a well-
defined subject matter. In the Preface to the first Edition of the Elements 
Whewell declares that 
 
Morality and the philosophy of Morality differ in the same manner 
and in the same degree as Geometry, and the Philosophy of Geometry… 
Men would never have discussed whether and why Geometrical Truth 
was possible, if they had not had before them and undeniable collection of 
such truth. Or, if without having any certainty or knowledge of Geomet-
rical propositions, Men had speculated and disputed, as to whether they 
could have such knowledge and such certainty; we cannot suppose that 
they could have arrived at any distinct or stable result of such specula-
tions (20). 
 
The current distinction between metaethics and normative ethics is 
believed – fairly enough – to date back to George Edward Moore’s formu-
lation of a distinction between ‘ethics’ and ‘casuistry’. Yet, it is clear 
enough that an idea of ethics as purely theoretical discipline, distin-
guished from normative ethics is already present in Sidgwick’s often 
quoted anti-Aristotelian dictum “not practice but knowledge” (21). What 
is less known to Sidgwick’s readers, but was indeed quite clear to Sidg-
wick – is that Whewell had introduced a distinction between Morality 
and the philosophy of Morality on whose basis the latter became a purely 
theoretical science, and besides that the construction of a consistent sys-
tem of morality was a prolegomenon to any  fruitful discussion of  theo-
retical issues concerning the nature and justification of ethics (22). 
 
 
3. Whewell’s system of morality 
 
The leading idea in our search for true moral propositions is that man acts 
qua man only when he acts under the guidance of reason, and the latter 
addresses us towards norms; the latter thus are required for the action of 
man as a man; indeed we cannot conceive of man without conceiving him 
as subject to norms and belonging to some norm-based order (23). The 
proof  lies in the fact that the authority of reason over our desires is self-
evident, for man is seldom impelled merely by the most elementary 
springs of action, bodily desires and affection” (24) but most of the time, 
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they “are unfolded by thought, so as to involve abstract conceptions and 
the notion of a Rule” (25), and in case of conflict between desire and rea-
son, we are aware that that our own act is the one we carry out in accor-
dance with reason, and the reason for this is that “the Reason alone is ca-
pable of that reflex act by which we become conscious of ourselves” (26).  
Our quest for a set of moral truths leads us to five basic ideas, implic-
itly underlying all the moral facts we discover by observation of law and 
custom in different societies, and besides to a basic moral norm that turns 
out to be a fundamental principle or axiom of morality as such. The five 
ideas of benevolence, justice, truth, order, purity “are dispositions con-
formable to the Supreme Law of Human Action: they are Virtues” (27), 
and they provide specific contents to the “Supreme Norm of morality”. 
The latter may be described by its end, that is the True End of human ac-
tion or the Summum Bonum, and may be framed in several alternative 
ways, such as “we ought to do what is right; we ought not to do what is 
wrong. To do what is right is our duty; to do what is wrong is a transgres-
sion, an offence, a violation of our duty” (28). 
A need for a Supreme Norm arises out of the need to answer questions 
about the justification of particular norms. The succession of means and 
ends with a corresponding succession of subordinate and superior norms 
has to stop somewhere. Thus, concerning the Supreme Rule, the question 
“why?” admits of no further answer. “Why must I do what is right? Be-
cause it is right. Why should I do what I ought? Because I ought. The 
Supreme Rule supplies a reason for that which it commands, by being the 
Supreme Rule” (29). 
Whewell’s claim was that morality arises from the Intellect, not from 
Sense (30). Only in the Preface to the second edition a concession is made 
to common sense, the notion cherished by his Cambridge idealist col-
leagues. He writes:  
 
Morality has its root in the Common Nature of man; and no Scheme 
of Morality can be true, except a scheme which agrees with the Common 
Sense of mankind, so far as the Common Sense is consistent with itself: 
including in the term Common Sense, both men’s convictions as to what 
is right, and their sentiments as to what is morally good (31).  
 
Whatever Whewell’s intentions in making such a concession, the fact 
is that rules of morality are derived from the Supreme rule and the bind-
ing character of the latter lies in its character of an axiom. That is, com-
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mon sense cannot but confirm rational morality, but the latter does not 
need the former in order to be justified. 
A serious traditional problem for which Whewell undertakes to pro-
vide an answer is the possibility of a conflict of duties. Whewell suggests 
that such possibility has been too much emphasized by casuists in order 
to find excuses for the omission of duty itself. A real conflict between du-
ties arises only in case of “extreme necessity”, while in the majority of 
cases of necessity there is an excuse for transgressing the moral law, but 
not a real conflict of duties (in these cases one could avoid to transgress 
the moral law and sacrifice one’s life as a heroic act, which would be su-
pererogatory).  There is genuine conflict between duties only 
 
in the case in which Moral Rules are transgressed, not for the sake of 
our own preservation, but in order to preserve some other person from 
great impending evil; we may have a Case of Necessity, which is also a 
Conflict of Duties: for to preserve another person from great evil, is a part 
of the general Duty of Benevolence; and when the person is connected 
with us by special relations, to do this, is involved in the Duties of the 
Specific Affections (32). 
 
Only in such cases “we have two Duties, placed in opposition to each 
other; on one side, the Duty of rescuing, from a terrible and impending 
evil, a husband, a friend, a daughter, a neighbour; on the other hand, the 
Duty of not telling a falsehood, or committing homicide” (33). For such 
cases “the Moralist must abstain from laying down definite Rules of deci-
sion” (34), firstly because in such cases a previous decision is difficult and 
accordingly general rules are of little use. Besides, to state 
 
General Rules for deciding Conflicts between opposing Duties, would 
have an immoral tendency. For such a procedure would necessarily seem 
to make light of the Duties which were thus, in a general manner, post-
poned to other Duties; and would tend to remove the compunction, which 
any Moral Rule violated, ought to occasion to the Actor (35).  
 
It is unavoidable that law be violated, but it is a good thing that 
compunction is left; the moralist’s task cannot be teaching the lawfulness 
of violating the law. People in cases of necessity will have no time to con-
sult the rules laid by the moralist, but “they will be determined in their 
conduct on such emergencies, by their previous moral culture and moral 
progress (36). Such cases are indeed real occurrences, and virtues dis-
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played in such cases are on the same occasion called heroic virtues, since 
tragic choices depend on a too strong adherence to one moral principle. 
Yet they may be admired to a point but not be recommended for imita-
tion, since to aim “at Heroic Virtues only, would be an extremely bad 
culture of ourselves. It would lead to an entire rejection of Duties” (37). 
Whewell’s main point yet is that moralists have overemphasized the 
possibility of conflict of duties. Most of such conflict is apparent one, 
since they simply arise from the existence of a plurality of principles, not 
by cases where danger of death is impending on some person to which we 
have duties of affection. Mere coexistence of conflicting rules creates in-
deed problems, but such as may on principle be settled by rational argu-
ment and problems concerning not such a disturbing question as “How 
may Duty be evaded?” but a more plain question such as “What ought I 
to do?” (38). The most typical of such questions, addressed in ch. 15, is 
veracity, or keeping promises and telling the truth, a matter discussed by 
moralists for centuries and about which a few quite questionable conclu-
sions have been circulated as if they were respectable opinions. Whewell’s 
general line of argument is that in most cases there is no need to ask 
whether we may be dispensed from doing what is our duty, since there are 
doubtful cases where it may be proved that it is or it is not our duty to 
keep a promise or to tell the truth. The general premiss is that words are 
not to be understood literally but according to the “mutual understand-
ing” which the use of language implies (39). From this general principle in 
several cases the proof may be given that one has no duty to keep a prom-
ise because a mutual understanding concerning the truth of a number of 
conditions is implied in every act of promising; this is why I have no duty 
of fulfilling a promise in case that “the Common Understanding of what 
the Promiser is to do for the Promisee, includes some false suppositions 
which are afterwards discovered to be false” (40). Whewell’s settlement of 
the allegedly doubtful case is that “the false supposition releases the 
Promiser, so far as it was included in the Common Understanding” (41. 
On the basis of such general principle Whewell gives an answer for a 
number of traditional debated issues, and on three specific cases argues an 
answer more rigorist than Paley’s. These are the case of the promise ex-
torted by fear, where he argues that the promise, if morally made, should 
be kept, even in cases where the law allows for duress as an extenuating 
circumstance. It is worth noting that Whewell argues that, even taking 
consequences into account, these are so uncertain that they can hardly 
play in favour of one alternative; for ex., will not paying a ransom dis-
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courage hijackers from further kidnapping, or will it prompt them to 
“add murder to robbery?”.  
 
Even on the balance of probable advantage, it would seem that such a 
promise is to be kept. 
But on our principles, we should not look to these results as to our 
own moral culture. By keeping this promise, we cherish and exemplify 
our regard for truth. What moral quality do we cultivate by breaking it? 
If it be replied, that we thus cultivate a regard for consequences; we re-
ply, that consequences, when both their existence, and their moral char-
acter are so doubtful, are not the main objects for our regard (42). 
 
Another case is the one of the author of an anonymous work who, ac-
cording to Paley, may deny his authorship while, according to Whewell, 
may try to guard his secret by avoiding to answer by various devices, but 
cannot tell overtly a lie, for all he may suffer is “some vexation or incon-
venience”, while by succeeding in keeping his secret at the expense of 
truth “he receives a moral stain” (43). Another case is that of lies told by 
advocates in favour of their clients, admitted of by Paley and ruled out 
by Whewell (44). One more is the promise made to a woman by a married 
man to marry her in case his wife would die. Paley’s answer was that it is 
wrong to claim that the promise was void “for, however criminal the af-
fection might be, which induced the promise, the performance, when it 
was demanded, was lawful; which is the only lawfulness required” (45). 
Whewell’s more complex answer is that, even if the promise is immoral, 
and by implication void, the duty to marry the woman does not depend 
on the immoral promise alone and the promiser may marry her since the 
promise “does not necessarily vitiate all the succeeding dispositions to the 
woman to whom the promise was made” (46).  
The allegedly dubious cases thus settled differ from one case, where 
the same dilemma presents itself for truth as for any other duty; this is 
the case of extreme necessity, where what is at stake is not some incon-
venience but life itself, or, even worse, not the agent’s but that of a third 
person’s life. Here, as in all similar cases, a breach of duty is excusable in 
the former situation, and is even required in the second, in so far as, by 
carrying out a lesser duty, we would violate a heavier one. 
Besides truth, also justice – discussed in ch. 21 – may be a ground for 
(real or alleged) conflict of duties. Rights are a condition for man’s action; 
they are defined by the State; but there is widespread a fundamental con-
viction, that rights are arbitrary. In other words, there is Natural Law, 
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depending upon the nature of man. Such law is not found somewhere else 
than in existing systems of law, and yet it is not coincident with any of 
them. The solution to the apparent dilemma arising is that 
 
Right cannot be founded on Injustice: such is the negative maxim, 
which serves to define the Idea of Justice. Justice assigns Rights according 
to existing Conditions: such is the positive maxim, which makes Justice 
applicable to facts (47). 
 
That is, there is an ideal and an arbitrary element in any legal frame-
work of rights. It is positive law that assigns specific rights, such as those 
of property, and in doing so it depends on facts, that is on “circum-
stances, which are not governed by our Ideas” (48), but existing ar-
rangements should be constantly improved in order to bring them more 
and more close to requirements of justice. How much and when is matter 
of external circumstances, and cannot be dictated by the Ideal element, 
but the idea of a Natural Law does not consecrate existing arrangements, 
on the contrary provides a standard for amending them. 
Sidgwick’s criticism to intuitionism in the Methods will concentrate 
precisely on these two points, truth and justice, assuming that they are 
the paramount cases where the inability to settle dubious cases by the 
‘method’ of intuitionism is particularly apparent. 
 
 
4. The Mill-Whewell controversy  
 
The controversy on ethics between Mill and Whewell took place between 
1852 and 1854, following another on philosophy of science, more precisely 
on induction. The difference between the two controversies is that the 
former was more academic in tone and in its course Mill paid due respect 
to Whewell’s superior merits in the field of the history of science,  the lat-
ter had all the aspects of a public controversy, one where what is at stake 
is control over the public opinion and the ultimate issue is, rather than a 
theoretical one, who is going to be the ruling group in a given society at a 
certain historical phase (49). 
A start was provided by Whewell’s criticism to Bentham in his Lec-
tures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England of 1852 (50). Mill 
thought it proper to attack openly Whewell after he had published an ex-
plicit criticism of Benthamite ethics, probably in order to be in a stronger 
position than if he had criticized the Elements, since he was in position to 
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complain of the fact that utilitarian ethics had been unfairly misrepre-
sented. Mill was not new to such exploits. A good example is his previous 
attack on Sedgwick’s allegedly “intemperate assault on analytic psychol-
ogy and utilitarian ethics, in the form of an attack on Locke and Paley” 
(51). Sedgwick had criticized Paley without even mentioning Bentham, 
and was made the target of Mill’s vehement counter-attack starting with 
the curious proviso that he Mill would not spend a word in defence of 
Paley, since he was a priest and hence a preacher of reactionary ideas. 
Mill’s odd argument is that, since Sedgwick, while criticising the reaction-
ary and superstitious Paley had implicitly attacked Benthamism for what 
the latter shared with Paleyism, and therefore he was twice guilty, for 
having attacked (implicitly) utilitarianism and for having ignored it (ex-
plicitly). The reason for Mill’s choice in this case was the – very good one 
indeed – that Sedgwick’s Discourse had enjoyed an enormous circulation 
and could accordingly grant comparable popularity also to its critic. Also 
in the case of Whewell’s Lectures the reason for the attack was the au-
thor’s prestige, besides the fact of having offered an occasion for com-
plaining of something, misrepresentation, unfair criticism, bad faith in at-
tacking a doctrine just because it subverted established prejudice etc., in-
stead of expressing sentiments of gratitude for the fact that an estab-
lished intellectual authority had dedicated no less than 63 pages to a dis-
cussion of the (until then neglected or at best execrated) Benthamite eth-
ics (52). 
The XXI century reader might ask why rationalism should find itself 
siding with religion, tradition, and political conservatism, while empiri-
cism in turn was taking sides with atheism, progress, and political liberal-
ism. Mill’s reasons were the following:  
 
the notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intui-
tion or consciousness, independently of observation and experience is, I am 
persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines 
and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory, every inveterate belief and 
every intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to 
dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected 
into its self-sufficient voucher and justification (53).  
 
But such an account sounds slightly odd. After all, on one hand, Ed-
mund Burke, the most able advocate of traditionalism, had based his own 
argument precisely on anti-rationalism, Hume, an empiricist if any, de-
fended a kind of mild Toryism; on the other, William Godwin had been a 
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rationalist radical, Richard Price, the intuitionist moral philosopher, had 
been a supporter of the cause of American independence and had been at-
tacked by Bentham from a more moderate stance.  
At the time Mill wrote his own attack on Whewell intuitionism was 
comparatively a novelty, and the very word intuitionism as the name for 
an ethical doctrine arouse out of Mill’s own classification of ethical think-
ing into the empirical school and the “doctrine of intuitive principles of 
morality” (54). There had been indeed a rationalist tradition in British 
ethics from the end of the seventeenth century, but in its first phase it 
was more Platonic than intuitionist in Whewell’s sense. In fact their main 
claim was a kind of moral realism, that is, a thesis in moral ontology, not 
a thesis in moral epistemology. Towards the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury the only advocate of some kind of ‘intuitionist’ ethics (as far as he 
put forth a claim in moral epistemology, namely that there are a number 
of prescriptions that cannot be denied at the price of logical contradic-
tion) had been Richard Price. The Scottish school, Thomas Reid and 
Dugald Stewart, defended against Humean empiricism the existence of 
moral principles belonging to the common sense, not to our rational facul-
ties, which is in turn a peculiar claim, different from both moral Platon-
ism and moral intuitionism as I have defined it. As a consequence, one 
may wonder who were the enemies Mill wanted to fight in his youth, since 
there was hardly any  rationalist or apriorist school around at that time 
defending both erroneous doctrines and bad institutions. The Scottish fol-
lowers of Dugald Stewart were outsiders to the establishment and com-
mitted liberal reformers, less radical than the Benthamites, but still 
clearly fellow-travellers, not enemies. Cambridge had been Paley’s own 
preserve, and Mill manifested despise for Paley and his followers – their 
empiricism notwithstanding – because of their conservative position 
cloaked under progressive language.  and thus one may wonder why ra-
tionalism, should be blamed for all the evils existing in the world.  
 
Whewell in his Lectures argued that Benthamite moral theory was de-
fective on two main points, namely the impossibility to calculate all con-
sequences of actions and the circumstance that happiness includes moral 
elements, and thus we cannot properly derive morality from happiness. 
Let me illustrate this criticism in more detail. Whewell wants to rule out 
the claim that morality be a means to some end, which in turn is not 
moral in its nature (55). He concedes for the sake of the argument the 
truth of the assertion that “acts are virtuous in proportion as they calcu-
lably produce happiness” (56) if we take all acts as a whole into account 
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and calculate all consequences, but he argues that, even on this premiss, 
it turns out to be impossible to make this assertion the very basis of mo-
rality. The first, already mentioned, reason for this impossibility is our 
inability to calculate all consequences of an act, or to solve so difficult a 
problem as that of establishing, among two lines of action, which one will 
yield the maximum amount of happiness (57); there is yet a more simple 
way of deducting such rules, that is, as Whewell explains in the Preface to 
the Second Edition of the Elements, considering that human beings living 
among other human beings need such rules and, “by the mere contempla-
tion of our human faculties and springs of action, we can discern certain 
relations which must exist among them, by the necessity of man’s moral 
being” (58). The second reason for this impossibility is that happiness in-
cludes moral elements, and thus we cannot just derive morality from 
happiness without falling into a vicious circle. For example, we may ask, 
“Why should a man be truthful and just? Because acts of veracity and 
justice, even if they do not produce immediate gratification to him and 
his friends in other ways… at least produce pleasure in this way; that 
they procure him his own approval and that of all good men” (59). This 
may be all right, but a Benthamite would add that he “thinks it virtuous, 
because it gives him pleasure: and it gives him pleasure because he thinks 
it virtuous. This is a vicious circle” (60). 
In 1852 in the Westminster Review Mill attacked Whewell’s Lectures on 
the history of Moral Philosophy and his Elements in a long essay. He ex-
plained that he had not discussed in public the Elements until the Lectures 
too were published, because the former work was of limited interest as 
such – being a “mere a catalogue of received opinions, containing nothing 
to correct any of them, and little which can work with any potency even 
to confirm them” (61), and that he felt that a rejoinder was required after 
Whewell’s attack on Benthamite doctrines in the Lectures, and finally 
that he felt that a consideration of at least some parts of the Elements was 
needed in order to expose the roots of Whewell’s mistake (62). Mill argues 
first that Whe  well in epistemology and ethics adopts arguments that 
justify use of a priori theses not derived from experience and in this way 
he finds a theoretical argument for justifying the transformation of the 
precepts of traditional morality in a system of allegedly self-evident 
truths (63). Then he argues that Whewell’s stronghold, that is his idea of 
a fundamental norm, that we must do what is right, is a tautology and 
thus does not contribute anything positive, unless we admit that doing 
what is right is equivalent to not violating rights, and in this case his sys-
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tem of morality is made dependent on positive law, so that his rule of 
right is 
 
to infringe no rights conferred by the law, and to cherish no disposi-
tion which could make us desire such infringements! According to him, 
the early Christians, the religious reformers, the founders of all free gov-
ernments… and all enemies of the rights of slaveowners, must be classi-
fied among the wicked (64). 
 
Thirdly, he claims that to make morality depend on other elements, 
themselves moral, as Whewell wants to do, would end up with a vicious 
circle, but actually Whewell cannot keep up his own standard and in the 
end he admits that morality serves other ends, themselves not moral in 
their nature, that is preventing “a disturbed and painful state of society” 
(65), but – Mill comments – this is utility or, in a word, when “real rea-
sons are wanted, the repudiated happiness-principle is always the re-
source” (66). 
Whewell responded to Mill’s criticism in ch. 2 of the bulky Addendum 
he wrote for the third edition of the Elements. The points he made are: 
first, that his reasoning was not circular because right means just “what 
must be done”, and there is no further reason, that is, no “why” is intro-
duced for doing what must be done (67); second, that he was not a utili-
tarian in practice, since he did not derive fundamental rights from human 
happiness, even while agreeing that they serve also this purpose (68); 
third, that he had not based morality on law, but just used law as an “in-
dication of its place and form” (69). 
To sum up, in Snyder’s words, Whewell claims there is 
 
a progressive intuition of necessary truth in morality as well as in sci-
ence. Hence it does not follow that because the moral truths are axio-
matic and self-evident we currently know them… Nevertheless, Whewell 
does claim that we can look to the dictates of positive law of the most 
morally advanced societies as a starting point in our explication of the 
moral ideas. But he is not therefore suggesting that these laws are the 
standard of morality… Mill is therefore wrong to interpret Whewell's 
moral philosophy as a justification of the status quo or as constituting a 
"vicious circle." Rather, Whewell's view shares some features of Rawls's 
later use of the notion of “reflective equilibrium” (69). 
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And, if we try to assess the reason d’être and the outcome of this con-
troversy, these turn out to have been rather bizarre ones. Looking at the 
philosophical pulp, not at the political rind, they were both  trying to do 
something that was, albeit not the same thing, at least something that 
was much closer than Mill realised. I may conclude, again in Snyder’s 
words, that  
 
Their conceptions of morality were quite similar in some important 
respects. Both men eschewed the utilitarianism of Bentham, which as-
serted that pleasure was the sole  determinant of virtuous action. Instead, 
both erected moral philosophies that stressed the importance of creating 
morally excellent characters that would find happiness in acting virtu-
ously. Both believed that a proper education – one aimed at “cultivating 
minds” – would help in creating this kind of moral character. Moreover, 
both had hopes that a widening of the scope of this type of education 
could lead to an improved society (70). 
 
 
5. Sidgwick’s Holzwege: from morality towards religion, heading nowhere 
 
The impact of this controversy on Sidgwick could be hardly overempha-
sized. The two decades after it were his formative years, and he struggled 
hard in order to find his own intellectual path. What should be kept in 
mind is that Mill was the winner on the ‘external’ ground: in the following 
three decades that “marked the peak of Mill’s reputation and influence as 
a public figure, and he quite deliberately set about exploiting his ac-
knowledged intellectual authority to promote certain social and political 
views as they related to the leading public issues of the day” (71), and 
while Whewell was being rather quickly forgotten by the academic and 
even the religious establishment. On the other hand, I would dare to sug-
gest that Whewell was in a sense a winner of the controversy on the ‘in-
ner’ ground, in so far as several of the changes and qualifications to Ben-
thamite utilitarianism introduced by Mill in Utilitarianism of 1861 were 
precisely on points raised in the controversy with Whewell, and – let me 
add – while paying lip service to Bentham and manifesting execration for 
the “intuitional” moralists, incorporating much of Whewell’s criticism 
into his own revised version of Utilitarianism (72). But what happens on 
the inner ground is of interest only to academic scribblers, while what 
happens on the open battlefield determines who is going to be the boss, 
which books will be reprinted, which books will be adopted in universi-
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ties, which names will be mentioned reverentially by semi-educated elites, 
and in fact the fourth edition of the Elements of 1864 will be the last one 
for one and half a century while Mill’s Utilitarianism will be reprinted 
and translated into many languages an incredible number of times, and 
authors of textbooks in many countries have been repeating just what 
Mill said about intuitionism. 
In his different phases, Sidgwick kept on being, as a whole, a follower 
of Mill, at least on things that really matter, that is, everything but phi-
losophy. He wanted to find his own tortuous path to truth, at times de-
fining himself a utilitarian and at times leaning towards Kant and Butler 
and Reid, or alternatively towards Goethe and perhaps the Greek phi-
losophers. But in the phases in which he looked for intuition, as against 
empiricism, he was careful in styling himself as a critical follower of the 
progressive party, leaving as little room as possible to suspicions of sym-
pathies for the establishment, old Cambridge, and the Church of England. 
This is why he chooses his allies, in this phase, in Germany or in the Brit-
ish eighteenth century. Besides, he depicted himself on purpose as an im-
partial inquirer into truth in moral matters, a scientist, as contrasted 
with a preacher. He even added, while actually recalling Aristotle’s pro-
ject of transforming common-sense morality into a consistent system of 
opinions, a kind of Spinozean flourish in declaring that also the study of 
morality may be undertaken not in order to become better men – as Aris-
totle believed – but just for love of truth, like the theoretical sciences, a 
view that would be incompatible with Aristotle’s view of practical phi-
losophy as different in goal and standards from theoretical philosophy. 
Sidgwick also referred to his own encounter with the Nichomachean Ethics 
as some kind of revelation of the right kind of job to be carried out by 
moralists, but nonetheless, one page before, he mentioned “mathemati-
cians” as embodying the standard of precision and clarity on which the 
“Intuitional moralists” should be judged (73). This self-image – as argued 
by Schultz – has much to do with his own rhetorical strategy, which may 
be summarized as follows: present a few subversive ideas on top of a bal-
last of shared opinions, mix heresy with Philistine common-sense, call all 
this ‘science’ or ‘philosophy’ and vindicate freedom of speech in the name 
of the impartial and objective approach you are entitled to adopting in so 
far as you are a member of the elite and a professional philosopher. 
On the contrary, ethics was for Sidgwick a subject with deep existen-
tial implications, verging even more than on practical morality on the is-
sue of the meaning of life, the existence of design and purpose in the 
world, and the problem of evil or theodicy. Sidgwick’s real problem was 
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whether there is a way of reconciling rationality with the set of beliefs 
into which he had been educated and to which he had preserved a deep 
attachment up to the time of his studies at Cambridge. Such set of beliefs 
de facto meant Anglican theology of a non-traditionalist as well as non-
Evangelical kind and the rationalist ethics taught by Whewell. Had he 
been a Cambridge undergraduate three decades before there would have 
been Paley’s consequentialist voluntarism instead of Whewell’s rational-
ist intuitionism. As a matter of fact, since the constellation of elements he 
had to face was this one, Sidgwick’s idea of a philosophical defence of tra-
ditional morality amounts to Whewell’s rationalism, and he seems not to 
be aware of the fact that the very same set of precepts had been taught 
for centuries cloaked under a Thomist, an Aristotelian, and more recently 
in England a consequentialist voluntarist philosophical jargon (or rather, 
he seems to refuse to draw consequences from something he knew too 
well). He wrote, at the time of the sixth edition, that as a teenager he felt 
uneasy under 
 
the apparently external and arbitrary pressure of moral rules which I 
had been educated to obey, and which presented themselves to me as to 
some extent doubtful and confused; and sometimes, even when clear, as 
merely dogmatic, unreasoned, incoherent (74). 
 
He added, that his feelings of uneasiness were but  
 
intensified by the study of Whewell’s Elements of Morality which was 
prescribed for the study of undergraduates in Trinity. It was from that 
book that I derived the impression – which long remained uneffaced – 
that Intuitional moralists were hopelessly loose (as compared to mathe-
maticians) in their definitions and axioms (75). 
 
Did he remember – while writing so – what Aristotle had said about 
different degrees of precision admitted of by theoretical and practical phi-
losophy? Apart from this, the reported version of the story is something 
Sidgwick wrote thirty years after the first edition of the Methods. A cir-
cumstance worth stressing is that Whewell’s book was the textbook he 
had to study as an undergraduate,  that his feelings to it may have been 
over-determined by the way he felt with regard to his own previous moral 
education. It is far from clear that Sidgwick ever read seriously the work 
at a later stage when he discussed the “Intuitional moralists” in the 
Methods, and the impression may be not unjustified that, for various rea-
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sons, he did not. One of these reasons may have been that he believed 
that it was necessary to distinguish between intuitional “ethical writers… 
who have confined themselves mainly to the definition and arrangement 
of the Morality of Common Sense, from those who have aimed at a more 
philosophical treatment of the content of moral intuition” (76) and that 
“the more philosophical school is the earlier” (77), that is Clarke and for 
some aspects also Butler. Another reason may have been that he was in-
terested in intuitionism more as a possible ‘method’ he partly shared and 
this kind of intuitionism was a way of dealing with, and improving, com-
mon sense, and accordingly he was more interested in what the Scottish 
common sense philosophy had to say than in what Price and Whewell, 
the real intuitionists according to my definition of the term, had to say, 
and in facts he seems to ignore totally the former and to repeat on the lat-
ter the judgment passed on him by Mill, that of being the author of a 
“classification and systematizing” of moral prejudice, without apparently 
having taken the most theoretical part of the Elements into serious con-
sideration. A third reason is that he did believe there were no serious dis-
cussions of ethical issues by ‘really-existing intuitionism’ and accordingly 
did not examine such discussions in detail preferring to concentrate on his 
own home-made intuitional method or on the conclusions allegedly 
reached by “Common Sense Morality”, which he sought elsewhere, in 
writings by jurists or in prevailing opinions as he was able to reconstruct 
them through amateurish sociological observation. That is, as Donagan 
aptly remarked, there is a qui-pro-quo in Sidgwick’s confrontation with 
Whewell and the intuitionists in general, arising from his assumption 
that, in order to be able to vindicate a self-evident character of moral first 
principles one should assume that morality be already evident in all its 
implications to common sense (78). Such request is too demanding and 
fails to meet Whewell’s explicit argument that “in moral no less than in 
physical speculation”, we face “a gradual and successive clearing and un-
folding of those ideas which, on each subject, our knowledge must in-
clude, and in terms of which those speculative truths at which we arrive 
must be expressed” (79).  
And yet, even if one could hardly believe that Sidgwick could lapse 
into such a blunder, an explanation of the reasons why he actually did 
could be found in his own overall strategy. 
Before discussing this strategy, let me add something on the horizon 
of existential questions within which his inquiry into the so-called ‘meth-
ods’ of ethics took place. Sidgwick oscillated at different times of his life 
between Millian empiricism and some kind of mysticism, and between 
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‘Christian’ ascetism and a pagan or romantic experientialist approach to 
life. He wrote that among  “the deeper problems” in  which he was inter-
ested at the time, the main one was that of reconciling his  “religious in-
stinct” with his “growing conviction that both individual and social mo-
rality ought to be placed on an inductive basis (80). 
 
The following year he wrote: 
 
I am revolving a Theory of Ethics… I think I see reconciliation be-
tween the moral sense and utilitarian theories (81). 
 
And shortly after he added: 
 
My instinct for it [mysticism] is yet so strong that I am gradually de-
veloping my intuitive theories… You know I want intuitions for Moral-
ity; at least one (of Love) is required to supplement the utilitarian moral-
ity, and I do not see why, if we are to have one, we may not have others. 
I have worked away vigorously at the selfish morality, but I cannot per-
suade myself, except by trusting intuition, that Christian self-sacrifice is 
really a happier life than classical insouciance… That is, the question 
seems to me an open one. The effort to attain the Christian ideal may be a 
life-long painful struggle; and therefore, though I may believe this idea 
when realised productive of greater happiness, yet individually (if it is not 
a question of life or death) my laxness would induce me to prefer a lower, 
more attainable Goethean ideal. Intuitions turn the scale. I shall proba-
bly fall away from Mill and Co., for a phase… Another way out of it is 
finding the foundation of Christianity inexplicable by ordinary laws, and 
therefore, as the vulgus [do], worshipping the mystery, and obeying 
(child-like) the moral and religious intuitions of Christ, and, to a certain 
extent, of the Apostles (82). 
 
If we look at Sidgwick’s swings between different ‘methods’ through 
these letters, the different ‘methods’ of ethics start looking less as purely 
logical possibilities open to the human mind, and more as real-world al-
ternatives. The choice among such alternatives had little to do with disin-
terested speculation, if the slogan “Knowledge not Praxis” is understood 
according to the prevailing mood of mainstream analytic philosophy, 
made of technical refinements, discussions of purely academic issues, and 
avoiding the Big Questions, or instead it was precisely ‘disinterested’ 
speculation of the best kind if one understands by the word open-
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mindedness in a quest for the  meaning of life. Basically, Sidgwick, the 
son an Anglican Rector (not unlike Nietzsche, the son of a Lutheran Pas-
tor, and Durkheim, the son of a Rabbi) mourned until the end of his life 
over the death of God, longed for his resurrection, and found it over and 
over again impossible; in the while, he had found a substitute for his lost 
Ithaca in a progressive and humanitarian movement, Millian utilitarian-
ism, not unlike Durkheim in France became an adept of republicanism. 
Both Sidgwick and Durkheim illustrated ad abundantiam the shortcom-
ings of their respective secular churches’ Creed, but also argued that peo-
ple should be made to believe in such assumption as a token for non-
existing more grounded ideals. Nietzsche took a different turn when he 
denounced humanitarian secular churches as the last harbingers of super-
stition, and looked bravely for the coming of some kind of ultra-man, one 
that could do without humanitarianism and pseudo-churches. Coming 
back to Sidgwick, it is as well to quote Keynes’s famous dictum according 
to which he “belonged to the tribe of sages and pastors” (83) and elabo-
rate on Keynes’s suggestion, speculating that perhaps he wished he still 
could be a Christian and, precisely because he knew too well this was im-
possible, he wanted to be a Millian.  He never betrayed – his mixed feel-
ings to Mill himself notwithstanding – his loyalty to the  Millian camp, 
not so much on theoretical as on real-world issues, precisely because, after 
the loss of the  Christian faith – a Millian ‘Religion of Mankind’ was eve-
rything he had to preach.  
In his unfulfilled wish to be a Christian, the great question Sidgwick 
kept on asking himself was one not infrequently asked in the nineteenth 
century, first by Kant and then in England by Coleridgean Idealists, 
namely, after we have proved that some kind of moral order in the hu-
man world has its own justification (the typical Enlightener’s claim), is 
there a way to travel from the assumption of a moral order in the human 
world to a different claim, that of a cosmic moral order, implying the ex-
istence of a God as a judge? To this question, another – also a legacy of 
the Enlightenment – was added, namely, why is there underserved evil in 
the world? These questions were the ones debated by the Cambridge ide-
alist sympathisers of Coleridge, first Frederick Denison Maurice and then 
George Grote and a number of less known figures with whom Sidgwick 
had been in close contact for decades (84). These were the questions that 
really mattered for Sidgwick. In a sense The Methods is a more an essay in 
theodicy than a treatise of ethics. In 1888 Sidgwick declared that “some-
how or other, morality will get on” (85) and that maintaining morality 
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not somehow but establishing it “logically as a reasoned system” was an 
impossible task if we were to admit that 
 
we are limited to merely mundane sanctions, owing to the inevitable 
divergence, in this imperfect world, between the individual’s Duty and 
his Happiness (86). 
 
The dismal conclusions of the first edition of the Methods – the two 
very last words were “unavoidable failure” – rephrased in a slightly 
smoother way in the following ones, refer, more than to the issue of nor-
mative ethics, to the unattainable ‘moral theodicy’. 
 
 
6. Sidgwick’s missing criticism to Whewell 
 
Let us come now to Sidgwick’s intellectual strategy, and let me try to lo-
cate Sidgwick’s discussion of Whewell within such a strategy. Sidgwick 
insisted that in the Methods he had not been discussing intuitionism as a 
doctrine viewed at ‘from outside’, but was discussing instead the intu-
itional method as a method in which he himself could not avoid believing. 
He declares that “the general aim of the part of my treatise which deals 
with Intuitionism” is not  
 
criticising from the outside a particular school or sect of moral phi-
losophers. My endeavour was rather to unfold a method of reaching prac-
tical decisions which I find (more or less implicit) in the ordinary thought 
of the society… The doctrine which is called by the name Intuitionism is 
only one of those phases (87). 
 
Sidgwick’s genuine criticism of Whewell’s moral doctrine may be 
found instead in the Outlines of the History of Moral Philosophy for English 
Readers. Here he makes it clear that he believes the philosophical basis of 
intuitionism to have been worked out in full in the eighteenth century 
and that nothing important has been added after. He thinks that neither 
“Reid nor Stewart offers more than a very meagre and tentative contri-
bution to that ethical science by which… the received rules of morality 
may be rationally deduced from self-evident first principles” (88) and that 
Whewell has been “more ambitious, but hardly more successful” (89), 
since his attempt “differs from that of this Scotch predecessors chiefly in 
a point where we may trace the influence of Kant – viz., in his rejection of 
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self-love as an independent rational and governing principle. And his con-
sequent refusal to admit happiness, apart from duty, as a reasonable end 
for the individual” (90). It is true that Whewell has a “certain air of sys-
tematic completeness”, and his five basic moral ideas try to depict a sys-
tem of normative principles that be as complete as possible, but at a 
closer look  
 
we find that the principle of order, or obedience to government, is not 
seriously intended to imply the political absolutism… The formula of jus-
tice is given in the tautological or perfectly indefinite proposition “that 
every man ought to have his own”… however… this latter formula must 
be practically interpreted by positive law, though he inconsistently 
speaks as if it supplied a standard for judging laws to be right or wrong… 
Purity… merely particularises that supremacy of reason over sensuous 
impulses which is involved in the very notion of reasoned morality as ap-
plied to a being whose impulses are liable to deviate from rational duty 
(91). 
 
Thus, 
 
if we ask for a clear and definite fundamental intuition, distinct from 
regard for happiness, we find really nothing in Whewell’s doctrine except 
the single rule of veracity (including fidelity to promises); and even of this 
axiom the character becomes evanescent on closer inspection, since it is 
not maintained that the rule is practically unqualified, but only that it is 
practically undesirable to formulate its qualifications (92). 
 
And so the general judgment Sidgwick passes on nineteenth century 
intuitionism is that 
 
the doctrine of the intuitional school, down to the middle of the pre-
sent century, had been developed with less care and consistency than 
might have been expected, in its statements of the fundamental axioms 
or intuitively known premises of moral reasoning. And if the controversy 
which this school conducted with the utilitarianism of Paley and Ben-
tham had turned principally on the determination of the matter of duty, 
there can be little doubt that it would have been forced into more serious 
and systematic effort to define precisely and completely the principles 
and method on which we are to reason deductively to practical conclu-
sions. But in fact the difference between intuitionists and Utilitarians as 
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to the method of determining the particulars of the moral code was com-
plicated with a more fundamental disagreement as to the very meaning of 
‘moral obligation’ (93). 
 
Let us examine now The Methods (94). On the one hand it is apparent 
that the book is not a utilitarian work. It was not so for theoretical rea-
sons, namely that Sidgwick’s own coherentist way of justifying the prin-
ciple of utility, alternative to Mill’s ‘proof’ and to Bentham’s  ‘axiomati-
sation’ of the principle itself was not – to Sidgwick’s eyes – completely 
successful, at least as far as it worked against the intuitionist opponent 
but it did not work against the egoistic one. But it was so also for 
pragma-rhetoric reasons, namely because Sidgwick wanted to make the 
utilitarian doctrine, still perceived as a radical one, palatable to the audi-
ence by submerging its novelty under a heavy cloak of opinions suppos-
edly supported by  commonsense. As a result, and curiously enough, utili-
tarianism is criticized more in depth than intuitionism. Indeed Sidgwick 
works out a destructive criticism of the former doctrine heading to the 
conclusion that it lacks a real justification, is impossible to apply, and yet 
is the only way of talking about morality that makes any sense, since in 
order to make sense, an ethical theory should appraise actions on the ba-
sis of their consequence. The reader who would expect a parallel system-
atic discussion of intuitionism may be deceived in finding instead a dis-
cussion of “dogmatic intuitionism” that is exemplified by recourse to be-
liefs allegedly shared by the enlightened common opinion or by jurists, 
such as Blackstone who never had anything to do with the intuitionist 
philosophers This is strange enough, but Sidgwick had his own (more or 
less good) reasons for that. The fact is that a discussion of historically 
given intuitionism is never at issue here and Sidgwick does not take the 
pain to be fair to “Intuitional philosophers” because in this work he is 
considering their doctrines only occasionally and as examples of those 
procedures he believes to be practised by enlightened common sense and 
in whose (limited) validity he believes too. Thus the kind of intuitionism 
he discusses here is as a puppet he has tailored to his own purposes, not 
out of sheer bad faith, but instead as a kind of unintended effect of his 
own strategy vis-à-vis intuitionism conceived in terms of rescuing what is 
‘living’ in intuitionism itself while discarding what is ‘dead’ (namely, un-
due philosophical overgrowth). Within the framework of such an ap-
proach to intuitionism, Whewell’s doctrine seems to be not the real thing, 
but some kind of hybrid. In Sidgwick’s view, it consists half of the naïve 
‘perceptive’ intuitionism that is allegedly the ‘doctrine’ uncritically 
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adopted by common sense, the doctrine according to which good and bad 
actions are perceived immediately as such, and the other half consists in a 
philosophical theory, which in turn is useless in order to ground the doc-
trine. 
In more detail, when Sidgwick wants to illustrate some philosophical 
doctrine defended by so-called “dogmatic intuitionism” he prefers to refer 
to Clarke as to the proponent of a more solid doctrine on the foundations 
of ethics and he refers to Reid as to the proponent of a more detailed re-
constructions of the data of ethics such as may be reconstructed on the 
basis of common sense morality. Price and Whewell, strangely enough, 
are discussed less than Clarke and Reid, and are never presented as the 
proponents of a specific kind of intuitionism. The reason may be that – as 
I have already illustrated – the old intuitional school for Sidgwick in-
cluded the Cambridge Platonists and allies, the new school included the 
Scottish common sense philosophers. Whewell, who was the avowed 
source of Sidgwick’s dislike for “intuitional” doctrines, was neither dis-
cussed systematically nor given a consistent location either within the old 
school, to which his extreme rationalism seemed to draw him nearer, or 
with the new school, from which his own rationalism seemed to divide 
him. The reason may be that for both Price and Whewell common sense 
has a very limited importance, since their own kind of ‘intuitionism’ 
starts with the idea of self-evident rational propositions, not – unlike 
Reid, Stewart, Coleridge, Maurice, and perhaps Grote – with that of be-
liefs universally shared by humankind, and accordingly neither Price nor 
Whewell fits well Sidgwick’s idea of an intuitionist. 
What Sidgwick does is mentioning Whewell a number of times with 
reference to individual issues. In the seventh edition he mentions him ex-
plicitly eight times, and besides he clearly refers to some of his theses on a 
handful of occasions. Only twice the explicit mention is followed by a 
footnote with some precise reference. One of these, coming after mention 
of “cheerfulness, and the cultivation of the social affections” is apparently 
mistaken since it refers to Whewell’s chapter where chastity is discussed, 
which is in fact the subject of Sidgwick’s following paragraph (95); clearly 
enough, one more footnote referring to Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue should 
show up at this point, since Sidgwick mentions the doctrine according to 
which appetite should be satisfied as a means of fostering “cheerfulness 
and the cultivation of the social affections”, which is indeed Kant’s doc-
trine (96). Let us examine six different topics about which Whewell’s 
claims are discussed: 
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1. The first is the existence of a system of moral intuitions, which 
Sidgwick refuses while formulating the idea that common sense made 
consistent may be the best proxy for such system. He writes: 
 
The orthodox moralists such as Whewell (then in vogue) said that 
there was a whole intelligible system of intuitions: but how were they to 
be learned? I could not accept Butler’s view as to the sufficiency of a 
plain man’s conscience: for it appeared to me that plain men agreed 
rather verbally than really. 
In this state of mind I had to read Aristotle again… What he gave us 
there was the Common Sense Morality of Greece reduced to consistency 
by careful comparison (97). 
 
2. On another occasion Whewell is mentioned as arguing the same as 
the Kantians, namely that a man “is a free agent in so far as he acts un-
der the guidance of reason” (98), and as offering the justification that we 
ordinarily “consider our Reason as being ourselves rather than our desires 
and affections: we speak of Desire, Love, Anger, as mastering us, or of 
ourselves as controlling them. If we decide to prefer some remote and ab-
stract good to immediate pleasures, or to conform to a rule which brings 
us present pain (which decision implies exercise of Reason). We more par-
ticularly consider such acts as our own acts” (99). Sidgwick admits that 
such statements win assent “from ordinary readers”, since what Whewell 
describes is our usual way of considering reason. Yet, even though he does 
not object to this idea of freedom as denoting “voluntary actions in which 
the seductive solicitations of appetite or passion are successfully resisted”, 
he sees a further problem that the Kantians as well as Whewell seem to 
overlook, that is, how to account for the very concept of responsibility, if 
one does not admit that an agent may be free to choose between acting 
rationally and acting irrationally. He adds: “ We may say, if we like, that 
when we yield to passion, we become ‘the slaves of our desires and appe-
tites’: but we must at the same time admit that our slavery is self-chosen” 
(100). Omitting discussion of the objection to Kant’s view of freedom, 
which goes beyond the scope of the present essay, we may ask whether 
this is a fair objection to Whewell. In fact, Whewell adds: 
 
If we ask why we thus identify ourselves with our rational part, 
rather than with our desires and affections; we reply, that it is because 
the Reason alone is capable of that reflex act by which we become con-
scious of ourselves. To have so much thought as to distinguish between 
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ourselves and our springs of action, is to be rational… It is by the Reason 
that we are conscious; and hence we place the seat of our consciousness in 
the Reason (101). 
 
Whewell would object that acting under control of desire and affec-
tion uncontrolled by Reason means being – so to say – “passive, and 
merely acted on” (102), or, to be more precise, an agent in such a situa-
tion “is not really passive” but just adopts the suggestions of Desire or 
Affection, and rejects the control of Reason; he thus does not cease being 
aware “that there is a Rule, and that he is violating it” (103). In other 
words, he would say that passion is not irresistible and human action, qua 
human, has as its “essential condition” some amount of rationality. In 
the Lectures the point had been framed in terms of a distinction between 
dependent and independent schemes of morality; the latter are those  
 
which would regulate human action by an internal principle or rela-
tion, as conscience or a moral faculty, or duty, or rectitude, or the superi-
ority of the reason to desire… We maintain, with Plato, that reason has a 
natural and rightful authority over desire and affection; with Butler, that 
there is a difference of kind in our principles of action; with the general 
voice of mankind, that we must do what is right, at whatever cost of pain 
and loss (104). 
 
Sidgwick goes on discussing the issue of Determinism and Free Will, 
which “is widely believed to be of great Ethical importance” (105) even if 
he is not sure it can be really settled. 
 
3. A third point with regard to which Whewell is mentioned is a criti-
cism to intuitionists of resorting actually to utilitarian considerations 
when trying to prove the necessity of moral rules. 
This is a leading motif from the controversy between Mill and Whe-
well, echoing Bentham’s main argument in favour of the principle of util-
ity, namely that those who deny this principle in fact do affirm it in other 
words. Mill quotes Whewell while declaring that rules are necessary for 
the peace of society and that, without the satisfaction of some desires 
made possible by an ordered social life, “man’s life is scarcely tolerable” 
(106), and he adds that here Whewell contradicts what he affirms else-
where, since moral rules “are here spoken of as means to an end… This is 
utility – this is pleasure and pain. When real reasons are wanted, the re-
pudiated happiness-principle is always the resource” (107). Mill goes on 
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widening the scope of his detection of the principle of utility in Whewell 
to the conclusion that  
 
Almost all the generalia of moral philosophy prefixed to the Elements 
are in like manner derived from utility. For example: that the desires, un-
til subjected to general rules, bring mankind into conflict and opposition; 
but that, when general rules are established, the feelings which gather 
round these “are sources not of opposition, but of agreement”… This is 
Benthamism – even approaching to Fourierism (108). 
 
He adds, as a further proof of the “hybrid character” of Whewell’s 
theory, the remark that also his classification of virtues and duties “are in 
principle utilitarian. Though Dr. Whewell will not recognize the promo-
tion of happiness as the ultimate principle, he deduces his secondary prin-
ciples from it, and supports his propositions by utilitarian reasons as far 
as they will go” (109). 
Was such criticism by Mill justified? I would remark that in ch. 3 
Whewell is trying to reach in the beginning something that is for him like 
an intermediate halting-place, that is the proof that human life in society 
needs systems of rules, in order to try to prove that there are “such Moral 
Rules as we have spoken of” – which he supposes to be something still in 
need of proof – and says that in order to arrive at such rules “we must pro-
ceed by series of several steps” (110). He goes on then trying to show how 
human action is by its very nature, constituted through rule following, 
how the various rules are subordinate to each other, and how they pre-
suppose a basic rule of human action (111). At this stage he believes he 
has proved not only that life in human society requires rules, but also 
that the constitution of human beings implies a set of rules which are self-
evident in their basic contents and have an authority given by what we 
would now call ‘internal’ reasons. In other words, he believes he has 
proved on the one hand, that human society needs some set of rules, on 
the other that such sets may be of worse or better kinds and that there is 
an a priori way to the discovery of the essential structure of the justified 
set of rules, to be given flesh and bones then through a survey of detailed 
conditions of life and institutions existing in a given society. This is the 
reason why Whewell believes that morality depends on law as to the 
proof of the existence of a need for morality and as to the specification of 
a part of its actual contents, but that on the other hand, really existing 
systems of laws may be properly appreciated on the standard provided by 
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morality, which is something Mill always refused to admit was Whewell’s 
point.  
Sidgwick, apparently giving Mill’s criticism for granted, bluntly states 
that  
 
even moralists (as Whewell) who are most strongly opposed to Utili-
tarianism have in attempting to exhibit the “necessity” of moral rules, 
been led to dwell on utilitarian considerations (112). 
 
Even if the assertion is made without reporting precise statements by 
either Whewell or others, the passage Sidgwick has probably in mind is 
precisely ch. 3 in the Elements, book I, which was attacked by Mill, and he 
seems to assume that Mill’s criticism was the final word. Besides he may 
have had his own historical reconstruction in mind according to which in 
the 17th century both intuitionism and utilitarianism were already there 
and both were in “friendly alliance” (113) fighting against the selfish sys-
tem first proposed by Hobbes, and both approaches were seen as alterna-
tive ways of supporting the existing morality. It was only with Paley and 
Bentham that utilitarianism was first presented as method for determin-
ing conduct, which was to “overrule all traditional precepts and supersede 
all existing moral sentiments” (114). Sidgwick seems to add to Mill’s ar-
gument that it was precisely because of such alliance that in the first 
phase no preoccupation arose with finding some ‘pure’ intuitionist way to 
“a philosophical basis of morality”, since the real danger was then Hob-
besian doctrine, and an opposition between utilitarianism and intuition-
ism was not on the agenda before Paley’s and Bentham’s time. 
 
4. A point connected with the former is Whewell’s allegedly inade-
quate account of justice, as far as for intuitionism – as Sidgwick under-
stands it – the idea of justice should translate what common sense under-
stands for justice into a more rigorous definition. Sidgwick declares that  
 
it is an assumption of the Intuitional method that the term ‘justice’ 
denotes a quality which it is ultimately desirable to realise in the conduct 
and social relations of men; and that a definition may be given of this 
which be accepted by all competent judges as presenting, in a clear and 
explicit form, what they have always meant by the term, though perhaps 
implicitly and vaguely (115). 
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On a careful examination of the data of common sense, it turns out 
yet that justice is “a kind of Equality” or better “Impartiality in the ob-
servance or enforcement of certain general rules allotting good and evil to 
individuals” (116) and that it includes the principles of reparation and 
those of conservative justice (compliance with contracts and laws and 
“normal” expectations) as well as of ideal justice, which in turns com-
prises conflicting ideals, namely the ideal of freedom and that of reward 
to desert (117). 
 
In secondary literature this account has gone unnoticed as a matter of 
course. Yet, even if Sidgwick ascribes this account to common sense, or to 
common sense sifted by philosophical scrutiny, it would be naive to as-
sume that the “Intuitional writers” were clearly on the same side with 
both ‘common sense’ and Sidgwick. In fact, Whewell’s account is some-
what different and it would be interesting to know whether Sidgwick had 
any specific objection to such an account. Whewell had defined justice as 
“the Desire that each person should have his own” (118), and the corre-
sponding part of Whewell’s Supreme Rule which belongs to this Virtue 
declares that “each man is to have his own” (119); more substantive con-
tents of such virtue and of the corresponding Rule, that is, a specification 
of the rights everyone may claim in matters of property, derive from his-
torically given institutions of each particular society, which vary accord-
ing to the previous historical circumstances and the present conditions of 
life, but which are not to be taken as something given once for ever but 
instead are to be modified with a view at a closer approximation to the 
ideal of equality between human beings (120).  
 
5. Another crucial topic is truthfulness and promises. On these issues I 
have already reminded that Sidgwick’s criticism is that Whewell is unable 
to provide any content that would not turn out "evanescent at a more ac-
curate examination". A duty to keep promises – Sidgwick acknowledges – 
is admitted by everybody; the obligation seems to unreflective common 
sense to be intuitively independent and certain; on the other hand, yet, 
existence of a number of exceptions seems to be commonly accepted: 
namely, when a promise contrasts with another obligation; when what 
has been promised is immoral; when circumstances have been modified; 
when the promise has been obtained by a lie etc. Common sense yet (note, 
common sense, not “intuitional” philosophy) seems to be unable to reach 
a consensus on what are precisely the cases where a promise must be kept, 
and “if one of these conditions vanishes it seems that consensus becomes 
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evanescent and that common moral intuitions of reflective persons be-
come obscure and diverge” (121). 
Among these a typical one is that of a promise formulated without 
prior knowledge of relevant facts or before important elements of the con-
text were modified. On this case, according to Sidgwick, common sense 
“seems to give no clear answer” (122). Why, if common sense fails, also 
other tentative ways of giving an answer should be dropped is never 
spelled out. That is, the “Intuitional” moralists did try to provide an-
swers, and these were based on rational a priori arguments, not on sur-
veys of what common sense seems to suggest. Here Sidgwick’s ambiva-
lence plays a decisive role. He was sure that it was so because the intui-
tive method was his own method as well as that of the most educated part of 
society, and accordingly he only needed to ask himself and consult his ac-
quaintances over a cup of tea, a method not different from the one Hume 
himself used in order to discover what belief normally yields. But in Sidg-
wick’s case conclusions reached through his own kind of amateur socio-
logical survey concerning intuitions reached by common sense were then 
applied with no further step to the claims of intuitional philosophers as 
well, without apparently any strict duty to read what they had really 
said on the issue. This is particularly striking with reference to this issue 
and to Whewell, since in ch. 15 of book II of the Elements he had claimed 
to have given a solution precisely to this problem by his “Principle of 
Truth”, namely by establishing that in such cases as the one of the prom-
ise obtained by giving false information, any duty arising from the prom-
ise itself should always be understood as conditional duty, bound to 
truthfulness of the conditions made known at the time the promise is 
formulated. Whewell argues his conclusion also referring to cases widely 
discussed in the casuistic literature and already found in Cicero (123). In 
this way Sidgwick gives an answer to one question and makes the reader 
believe he has answered also a different one, namely he gives the impres-
sion he does not need to criticize Whewell’s solution, which is something 
different from what common sense suggests or fails to suggest. Whewell 
indeed never claimed that common sense has already settled the issue, but 
only that it be possible to solve it by means of distinctions that are rationally 
justifiable but also highly abstract and novel, and no way already famil-
iar to common sense. The fact that what he argues for is a novelty for 
common sense does not imply the validity of Mill’s accusation of falling 
back into considerations of expediency, since his argument is based solely 
on criteria of inner consistency, and Sidgwick, were he to prove that the 
intuitionists are wrong on the point, should have carried out a criticism of 
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the arguments of Whewell, the casuists, Cicero, not of the opinions alleg-
edly shared by common sense (124). It is surprising that on the one hand 
Sidgwick discards what intuitionism has to offer in order to settle the is-
sue on the argument that it seems that common sense have nothing to say 
and on the other avoids criticizing in detail the solution proposed by the 
last proponent of this doctrine. Sidgwick – as I have already suggested – 
had his own justification for this, namely that in the Methods he did not 
want to examine intuitionism as a doctrine from outside, but as a 
“method” practised by common sense and to a certain extent accepted by 
Sidgwick himself. But here Sidgwick’s ambivalence to intuitionism 
(sometimes a mistaken philosophical doctrine and sometimes a plausible 
albeit limited “method” for formulating moral judgements) becomes an 
unconscious excuse for dodging the main objections that could withstand 
his will to be a Millian, or cast a doubt on his conclusion that utilitarian-
ism is a rickety building, and yet is the only roof left under which we may 
find shelter. 
A closely related issue is establishing limits or exceptions to the duty 
of truthfulness. The rule ‘to speak the truth’ would not be difficult to ap-
ply, yet, even if “many moralists have regarded this, from its simplicity 
and definiteness, as a quite unexceptionable instance of an ethical axiom” 
(125).  
Nonetheless, “reflection” shows that truthfulness cannot be raised to 
the status of a “definite moral axiom” (126) because common sense seems 
to admit that the right to truthfulness may be suspended under certain 
circumstances, such as those under which most of us “would not hesitate 
to speak falsely to an invalid” (127), and that we cannot establish “how 
we can decide when and how far it is admissible, except by considerations 
of expediency” (128). As a conclusion the rule of Veracity cannot be ele-
vated into a “definite moral axiom” for there is no agreement as to when 
absolute sincerity is required (129). Also the Kantian argument of the 
self-destroying character of the rule of lying under certain circumstances 
is discarded claiming – in a perfectly Millian spirit – that it is no more 
than a “strong – but not formally conclusive – utilitarian ground for 
speaking the truth” (130). 
Concerning Veracity Sidgwick makes a precise reference to Whe-
well. He writes: 
 
it is not uncommonly said that in defence of a secret we may not in-
deed lie (fn.: Whewell, Elements, book II, ch. xv, par. 299), i.e. produce di-
rectly beliefs contrary to fact; but we may “turn a question aside”… or 
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“throw the inquirer on a wrong scent”… These two methods of conceal-
ment are known respectively as suppressio veri and suggestio falsi, and 
many think them legitimate under certain circumstances: while others 
say that if deception is to be practised at all, it is mere formalism to ob-
ject to any one mode of effecting it more than another (131). 
 
Sidgwick’s own opinion has already been presented, that is, he en-
dorses the latter opinion. But let me remind, before trying to assess the 
goodness of Sidgwick’s criticism, what Whewell had actually written. 
This is: 
(i) that “the necessary conditions of a Rule of Human Action is the 
existence of a Common Understanding among men, such that they can 
depend upon each other’s premeditated and predetermined actions” 
(132); 
(ii) that the idea of Truth as a Virtue, which may also be named integ-
rity or Truthfulness, is the idea of a conformity of “our language to the 
universal understanding among men which the use of language implies” 
(133); 
(iii) that some kind of implicit contract that binds human beings to 
telling the truth, “the universal understanding among men which the use 
of language implies”, is tacitly signed when they start using language, 
and a “Right to know the Truth is conveyed, by every speaker, to the 
person to whom he addresses the assertions” (134); 
(iv) that lying, no less than not keeping a promise, is “a violation of 
the general understanding among mankind, which the use of language 
implies” (135); 
(v) that lying always carries a moral stain on the liar, with an excep-
tion to be made for cases of necessity, as when it is made to save one’s life, 
which is looked upon “as at least excusable, and allowable”, or to save a 
friend from some great misfortune, which meets “with a more decided ap-
proval” (136); 
(vi) that in cases of necessity which are also conflicts of duties, as far 
as a moral rule is transgressed not with a view at one’s preservation, but 
“in order to preserve some other person from great impending evil” it is 
better for the moralist to abstain from laying down definite rules of deci-
sion, for doing so  
 
would have an immoral tendency. For such a procedure would neces-
sarily seem to make light of the Duties which were thus, in a general 
manner, postponed to other Duties; and would tend to remove the com-
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punction, which any Moral Rule violated, ought to occasion to the Actor 
(137). 
 
It may be worth noting that with regard to lying Sidgwick quotes 
Whewell in a precise way, but also that he mentions his conclusion as one 
of these opinions which moralists allegedly share with common sense, and 
that he does not discuss in any detail Whewell’s solution to the conun-
drum raised by cases of necessity. Also here he has his own reason for not 
doing that, since he believes that a critique of the intuitionist moralists’ 
arguments goes beyond his own self-appointed task, which is amending 
and systematizing the opinions shared by common sense. This could be a 
convincing enough reason, if only Sidgwick after that did not announce 
the conclusion that as a consequence “dogmatic intuitionism” – which, 
according to Sidgwick himself, is tantamount to the doctrines of the Brit-
ish rationalist and/or common-sense moralists from Clarke, Butler, Price 
to Reid and Whewell – does not stand up. 
 
6. The relationship of morality and law. Sidgwick’s criticism to Whe-
well’s Idea of Order on which the latter grounded the claim that obedi-
ence to law be on principle an unconditional duty (138) echoes heavily the 
Mill-Whewell controversy. I recalled above how Mill had bluntly accused 
Whewell of implicitly defending slave owners and besides of heading to a 
vicious circle. Sidgwick denies that it be possible to settle conflicts be-
tween civil and moral law unless we have recourse to the utilitarian 
method since common sense only manifest a rather vague general consen-
sus on the idea that law as such should be obeyed. A proof of such impos-
sibility to reach precise shared conclusion is that “jurists” (note again, ju-
rists, not intuitional moralists) “have contrasting opinions as to the fact 
whether we are strictly bound to obedience to laws when they command 
what is not otherwise a duty or forbid what is not otherwise a sin” (139). 
On the basis of “so much difference of opinions” Sidgwick announces that  
 
It seems idle to maintain that there is any clear and precise axiom or 
first principle of Order, intuitively seen to be true by the common reason 
and conscience of mankind. There is, no doubt, a vague general habit of 
obedience to laws as such… but when we try to state any explicit princi-
ple corresponding to this general habit, the consensus seems to abandon 
us (140). 
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Note that the “axiom or first principle of Order” mentioned is not 
yielded by some mental experiment enacted by Sidgwick but is a notori-
ous Whewellian doctrine that contemporary readers could easily have as-
sociated with its author’s name. The principle is defined by the latter as  
 
a disposition to conform, both to positive human Laws… and to spe-
cial Moral Rules, as the expression of the Supreme Rule… And the corre-
sponding part of the Supreme Rule is: We must accept positive Laws as the 
necessary conditions of Morality (141). 
 
The remark is not out of place that the principle had not been intro-
duced by Whewell as a means of settling the issue under discussion by 
Sidgwick. The latter was a doubt concerning the subsistence of an obliga-
tion to obey the civil law in a number of cases, a familiar problem in casu-
istry, to which the casuists had given more complex answers than those 
ascribed by Sidgwick to the jurists, while mentioning just Austin, 
Hobbes, and Blackstone (142). Whewell’s aim was instead to examine a 
more general issue. Whewell had added: 
 
We must conform our Dispositions to the Laws; obey the Laws cor-
dially, or administer them carefully, according to the position we may 
happen to hold in the community. This disposition may be denoted by 
the term Order, understood in a large and comprehensive sense. But fur-
ther: not only positive human Laws, but subordinate moral Rules, are 
necessary conditions of morality. We cannot conform our actions, inten-
tions, desires to the Supreme Rule, without having in our thoughts sub-
ordinate Rules, which are partial expressions of the Supreme Rule; and to 
such subordinate Rules, it is our Duty to conform our Intentions and De-
sires. The disposition to do this may also be included in the term Order, 
taken in its largest sense (143). 
 
That is, what Whewell was concerned with in the quoted passage 
where he introduces the “axiom or first principle of Order” was the rela-
tionship of general and particular laws, be they civil or moral laws. Sidg-
wick seems to be ignorant of the circumstance that the problem men-
tioned had been treated by Whewell elsewhere, namely in the Elements, 
book IV, chapter 1. The fourth book of the 3d edition is something new, 
that was absent in the text Mill read – or did not read in full – but Sidg-
wick may have been just following Mill blindly without noticing that he 
had a detailed answer to Mill’s criticism by Whewell at hand. Mill had 
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made it a point of honour to declare that he had confined himself to those 
pages of the Elements which could be evidence on one point, that is, how 
he “argues in condemnation of any external standard, and especially of 
utility, or tendency to happiness, as the principle or test of morality [as 
well as] how he fares in his attempt to construct a coherent theory of 
morals on any other basis” (144). On a close reading, Mill appears to refer 
only to few pages in book I and he never mentions book IV, chapter 21 
where the issue of the relationship of law and morality is discussed in 
more detail than in the couple of pages from the “Preliminary Lecture” in 
the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England to which Mill, 
strangely enough, limits himself when discussing this point (145). 
In this chapter Whewell had done what he did later in a more detailed 
way in book IV of the 3d edition, that is, he had illustrated how morality 
depends on law for one aspect, the definition of rights, which are indeed 
the subject-matter of moral rules, but not for a different aspect, namely 
in so far as morality provides a standard on which historically given laws 
may be appraised and with a view at converging with which we may wish 
that they be modified, and “thus, for the moment, at any time, Morality 
depends upon Law; but in the long run, Law must be regulated by Moral-
ity” (146). 
It is important to remark that – contrary to what Sidgwick seems to 
believe – for Whewell the standard on which positive law is to be judged 
is not the axiom of Order, which is called to carry out rather the function 
that I have illustrated, but that of Justice (147). 
Besides, it may be mentioned that Whewell believed he had settled 
the problem whose existence Sidgwick denounces with regard to justice, 
namely that when we try to make the apparent principles in which it 
seems to consist more precise, “we find ourselves involved in grave diffi-
culties” (148). In Book II ch. 21 Whewell responds to the ancient objec-
tion according to which the law of nature, being positive laws different in 
different states, exists nowhere. The answer is that the trouble may be 
dissolved in the light of the general claim of circularity between Idea and 
Fact. In more detail the answer is that 
 
the Conceptions of the Fundamental Rights, which Law establishes, 
are necessary and universal for all men; but that the Definitions of these 
Rights are Facts, which grow out of the History of each community, and 
may be different in different times and places (149). 
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Again, Sidgwick does not seem to be aware of Whewell’s attempt at 
solving the problem, that is, at reconciling variability and universality, 
and thus never tries to criticize the solution offered. As I have argued, 
also on this issue, he believes he need not criticize intuitionist doctrines 
since he is not really interested in such doctrines but believes instead he 
should draw on common usage and try to reach a definition which be ac-
ceptable to all “competent judges”, and in doing so, so to say, “clip the 
ragged edge of common usage, but we must not make excision of any con-
siderable portion” (150). So much is what he thinks being required by the 
“Intuitional method” (151), but this, once again, is his own method, not 
the method of the intuitionist moralists. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks  
 
To sum up, my claims were the following: 
1. Sidgwick’s notion of “dogmatic intuitionism”, an expression reverently 
repeated by commentators, is a queer notion; it is the result of one of 
those divisions of one into two that philosophers use to stage every time 
they want to keep an old doctrine while claiming originality; in this case, 
dogmatic intuitionism was the ‘bad company’ to which all that Sidgwick 
did not like of “the intuitional school of morality” should be entrusted, to 
be distinguished from the ‘good company’, philosophical intuitionism that 
was to take over all that Sidgwick liked of this school;  that is, it was a 
way of disguising the fact that Sidgwick’s final doctrine was ethical intu-
itionism. 
2. Sidgwick’s reconstruction of the history of ‘intuitionist’ doctrines is 
an odd one in so far as he distinguishes between an earlier more philoso-
phical school and a later school more based on common sense; it is clearly 
Reid and Dugald Stewart that he has in mind, and Whewell, with his 
bold apriorism, seems to drop out of the picture; besides he ignores Price 
totally.  
3. Sidgwick has recourse to a strange enough argument for justifying 
his lack of a real criticism of intuitionist doctrines; that is, he is interested 
in assessing the role of intuitions in common sense, not the role assigned 
to them by philosophers, but then he constantly shifts from allegedly 
proved conclusions concerning the limits of common sense to unwar-
ranted conclusions on the intuitionists’ mistakes. 
4. Whewell had his own version of a rationalist (not common sense) 
intuitionist ethics, which followed Price closely and also incorporated a 
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few Kantian insights; on this version, moral dilemmas could on principles 
be settled through argument, but untutored common sense did not pos-
sess already a clear solution to such dilemmas. 
5. Such version incorporated solutions or alleged solutions to a few of 
those difficulties of moral reasoning that Sidgwick believed were decisive 
in proving the inability of both common sense and intuitionist ethics in 
settling moral dilemmas; Alan Donagan has claimed that Sidgwick’s po-
lemic is vitiated by the fact of ascribing to Whewell a claim that the lat-
ter had never advanced, that is, that common-sense morality may afford 
a solution to moral dilemmas; what Whewell did is proposing a way of 
dissolving, on the basis of intuitionist procedures (not of common sense 
morality), that is, starting with clauses and limitations to duties that may 
be logically derived from the general formulation of general precepts, 
most of apparent moral dilemmas; on examples such as the duty to keep 
promises extracted through reticence concerning relevant information 
Whewell’s answer is that such a promise is not a real promise since full 
knowledge of relevant facts is one of the conditions of the act of promis-
ing; Sidgwick does not discuss Whewell’s argument, and indeed it is im-
possible to prove that he ever read the relevant chapter, and limits him-
self to noting that common sense lacks an answer, but if intuitionists were 
right, common sense should already know the right answer (which is not 
what Whewell claimed). 
6. Sidgwick is far from immune to rhetoric, and indeed his work is a 
powerful experiment in persuasion, adopting as a systematic strategy the 
stratagem of introducing subversive ideas – among other things, concern-
ing current standards of sexual morality – hidden under a heavy burden 
of received opinions and justified repeatedly by appeal to one’s faithful-
ness to the duties carried by the status of philosopher or scientist; also the 
choice of writing dry and as-boring-as-possible treatises is a rhetorical 
trick no less than any declamation about the beauty of virtue; the mes-
sage conveyed is: “I am not a preacher, I am a scientist”; that is, Sidg-
wick’s trump is one of the rhetorical stratagems recommended by 
Schopenhauer: if you lack specific objections, shift from the point under 
discussion to general considerations on the limits of human knowledge, 
suggesting by implication that your opponent’s claim cannot have strong 
reasons on its side, since nobody’s claim does. 
7. Sidgwick wanted basically to defend Millian ideals, and believed his 
own theoretical work to be also a powerful exercise in persuasion; in order 
to do that, he believed he had to sacrifice all of  Mill’s (as well as Ben-
tham’s) strictly philosophical ideas on ethics, adopting instead Whewel-
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lian intuitionism as a “philosophy of  morality” (i.e. metaethics); but he 
used such philosophy of morality in order to support conclusions in mo-
rality (i.e. normative ethics) opposite to Whewell’s and close to Mill’s; by 
doing so, he wanted to defend a familiar view of ethics, shared by both 
Utilitarians and Intuitionists, against new approaches, Spencer’s evolu-
tionism and Bradley’s idealism, as well as – had it been possible – against 
an old/new approach, ethical egoism, against which he confessed his 
weapons were blunt;  yet, he was keen in giving the impression that his 
newly assembled machine as Utilitarianism-on-a-new-basis, not as Intu-
itionism-improved; on the main philosophical  issue, the need for intui-
tions in ethics, he acknowledged the victory of Whewell on Mill but – 
what t is typical of all philosophical controversies  –  he  condemned the 
sinner while condoning the sin, and appropriated Whewell’s ideas while 
declaring the latter to be a shallow thinker. “We buy our opinions whole-
sale” was one of the  famous remarks by Montaigne; right or wrong, this 
is precisely what Sidgwick did, since  at some point he came back to 
Whewell on all that mattered for a philosopher, but he remained all his 
life aligned with the Utilitarian camp on real-world issues. The result was 
leaving to twentieth-century analytic ethics a legacy of intuitionist ideas 
combined with utilitarian opinions and sanctifying Mill’s image as a dis-
coverer of truths he would never had been able to discover by himself (i.e. 
without his controversy with Whewell), and damning Whewell’s figure to 
oblivion as but the efficient cause of  “one of the thousand waves on the 
dead sea of commonplace” (152). 
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